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FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of i969
Congress enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of
1969 (the Act) for the express purpose of protecting the health and safety
of coal miners.1 Consistent with the purpose of the Act, Congress passed
section 843 to decrease the incidence and development of black lung
disease.' Prevention of black lung disease is the primary objective of the
section and the federal coal mine legislation in g9neral.3 Specifically, sec-
tion 843(b)(2) provides that any miner who shows symptoms of black lung
has the option of transferring from his present position in the mine to a
position where the concentration of respirable dust is lowdr.4 Moreover,
section 843(b)(3) provides that if a miner chooses to transfer, the mine
operator must compensate him at the regular rate of pay the miner
received immediately prior to his transfer.' The transfer provisions en-
courage miners showing the first signs of the possible development of
' Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 2(a),
83 Stat. 742 (1969) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (Supp. II 1978)). See Westmoreland Coal Co.
v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 606 F.2d 417, 419-20 (4th Cir. 1979) (pur-
pose of Act is to promote safety of miner); District 6, UMW v. Interior Board of Mine Opera-
tions Appeals, 562 F.2d 1260, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (safety of miner is most crucial motivation
behind Act); H.R. REP. No. 91-563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2503, 2503 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 563] (purpose of Act is to
protect health and safety of coal miners).
I See 30 U.S.C. § 843 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 563, supra note 1, at 2522-23 (explaining im-
portance of § 843 for decreasing incidence and development of black lung disease). Black
lung disease (pneumonconiosis) is a chronic chest disease caused by the accumulation of coal
dust particles in the lung. H.R. REP. No. 563 supra note 1, at 2517-18. Upon continued ex-
posure of the victim to air with a high concentration of respirable dust, the disease will
become increasingly disabling and dangerous to the miner. Id. at 2518. Physicians classify
black lung disease from simple to complicated depending upon the degree of evidence in an
X-ray examination. Id. Simple black lung, the earliest stage, seldom produces significant
ventiliatory impairment. Id. The pinpoint type, a later stage, may reduce the ability to
transfer oxygen into the blood. Id. Complicated black lung is a more serious stage of the
disease. Id The patient with complicated black lung incurs progressive massive fibrosis, an
abnormal increase in the amount of fibrous connective tissue in an organ, which may include
tuberculosis and other infections. Id Complicated black lung usually produces marked
pulmonary impairment and considerable respiratory disability. Id The only effective
preventive procedures to inhibit the development of black lung are adequate environmental
dust controls, use of respirators, and removing affected miners from the dustier areas of the
mine as soon as doctors detect the disease. Id. at 2518-19. The fact that virtually no pro-
bability exists of a miner contracting a more severe case of black lung if the miner transfers
to an area of the mine where the amount of respirable dust in the air is below 2.2 milligrams
per cubic meter emphasizes the effectiveness of removing the affected miners from dustier
areas of a mine. Id. at 2521.
' See H.R. REP. No. 563, supra note 1, at 2520 (nothing short of total prevention of
black lung is acceptable objective of coal mine legislation).
30 U.S.C. § 843(b)(2) (1976).
5 Id. § 843(b)(3).
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black lung to transfer into an area of the mine which will reduce or
eliminate the chances that they will contract black lung disease." In addi-
tion, section 938 of the Act provides that a mine operator cannot
discriminate against any miner employed by him because the miner is
suffering from black lung disease.' In Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co.,'
the Fourth Circuit recently interpreted the phrase "regular rate of pay
received by him immediately prior to his transfer" of section 843(b)(3).'
The court construed the phrase to include only the dollar amount the
transferred miner received immediately prior to his transfer and not to
include any pay increases subsequently granted to miners in the trans-
ferred miner's prior job classification."0
In Matala, the plaintiff was a miner employed as a continuous mine
operator at a-Consolidation Coal Company mine." In March 1975, after
doctors diagnosed Matala as having symptoms of black lung, Matala ex-
ercised his right to transfer under section 843(b)(2) to a less dusty area of
the mine. 2 Consolidation then reclassified Matala as a general inside
laborer. 3 In accordance with section 843(b)(3), the company paid Matala
the same daily base rate he received under his prior job classification, a
dollar amount higher than his new job classification rate. Nevertheless,
Matala filed a complaint with the Department of Labor contending that
Consolidation's failure to grant him the wage increases subsequently
granted to miners in his old job classification constituted discrimination
against him in violation of section 938(a).1'5
See note 2 supra (explaining black lung disease and available preventive measures).
30 U.S.C. § 938(a), (b) (1976). Section 938(b) provides the miner with review of the
alleged discrimination by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id.
647 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 429.
10 Id.
" Id. at 428.
11 Id Under § 843(a), miners must under go chest examinations at intervals prescribed
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 30 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1976). The intervals
may not exceed five years in length. Id.
's 647 F.2d at 428.
1 Id. Matala received a higher dollar amount than other miners in his new job
classification immediately after his transfer. Id. at 428-29 n.4. At the time Matala filed suit,
however, two years and seven months after his transfer, he was receiving $8.08 a day less
than miners were receiving in his old job classification. Id In addition, Matala did not
receive the wage increases subsequently granted to miners in his new job classification un-
til the daily base rate for the miners in Matala's new, lower-paying job classification equalled
Matala's daily base rate upon transfer. Id Thus, Matala's protection against loss of compen-
sation upon transfer proved illusory almost immediately. Id.
11 Id at 428. At the time of Matala's transfer, the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1974 governed the hours, wages, job classifications and other working condi-
tions at Consolidation's No. 2 mine. Id- at 428 n.3. Matala continued to receive a monthly
$.07 per hour cost of living adjustment under the 1974 agreement. Id. Matala contended that
he should continue to receive the pay increases scheduled under the 1974 industry-wide
agreement as the increases became effective for miners in Matala's prior job classification.
Id. at 428. Further, Matala argued that a court should construe the act liberally so as not to
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The Secretary of Labor concluded that Consolidation had not dis-
criminated against the plaintiff since the company compensated Matala
at the same dollar amount he received immediately prior to transferring
positions in the mine.'6 The Secretary interpreted the "regular rate of
pay" language in section 843(b)(3) not to include the wage increases
subsequently granted to miners in Matala's prior job classification."'
Matala appealed to the district court for review of the Secretary's deci-
sion. 8 The district court reversed the Secretary's decision and granted
Matala's motion for summary judgment against the Secretary and Con-
solidation. 9 The court held that a miner who transfers under section 843
is entitled to the rate of pay associated with his prior job classification
rather than the strict dollar amount and thus is entitled to any future in-
creases associated with his prior job classification.0 Both defendants ap-
pealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.21
The Fourth Circuit stated that in questions of statutory interpreta-
tion, a court initially should discern congressional intent from the
language of the statute itself and should give the language its ordinary
meaning unless the legislative history or other evidence clearly indicate
a different usage.2 The court found that the ordinary meaning of "rate"
frustrate Congress' intent that miners who transfer should suffer no loss in compensation.
Id. at 429-30. See Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (transfer provision to insure miners afflected with"
black lung suffer no loss in compensation); S. REP. No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1969)
(same). Finally, Matala argued that a plain meaning interpretation of § 843(b)(3) may cause a
miner to suffer substantial-pay losses shortly after transferring if miners in his prior job
classification are granted subsequent pay raises. 647 F.2d at 430.
" 647 F.2d at 429.
17 Id.
"Id.
Matala v. Marshall, 483 F. Supp. 1332, 1333 (N.D. W.Va. 1980).
" Id. The district court granted Matala's summary judgment motion under rule 56(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after finding that the parties stipulated to all of the
material facts. Id. at 1332-33. Moreover, the court determined that the Secretary's in-
terpretation of § 843(b)(3) was plainly erroneous as a matter of law. Id. at 1333.
647 F.2d at 429.
= Id. at 429-30. See State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924-25 n.20 (4th
Cir. 1977) (statutory language is most persuasive indication of congressional intent and
court should reject statutory language only on substantial unambiguous evidence support-
ing contrary interpretation); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 1974) (Con-
gress presumed to have used words according to ordinary meaning, unless different
signification clearly indicated). The rule of statutory construction that a court should give
the language of a statute its ordinary meaning unless a different usage clearly is indicated is
known as the "plain meaning" rule. See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Mean-
ing"Rule and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem"Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1299, 1299 (1975). The plain, meaning rule is not a rule of law, but a rule of statutory con-
struction. See F. FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES 22-24
(1947) (discussing history of plain meaning rule of statutory construction); Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision ,and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 403 (1950) (listing plain meaning rule as
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is dollar amount.' Further, the Matala court determined that a court
should interpret the phrase "regular rate of pay" in conjunction with the
rest of section 843(b)(3).24 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that when the
phrase "regular rate of pay" is interpreted with the rest of section
843(b)(3), the plain meaning of "rate," that is, dollar amount, is confirmed
by the modifying phrase "received by him immediately prior to his
transfer."2 The court further opined that to interpret "rate" to mean
classification rate would render the phrase "received by him" meaning-
less since "rate" then would include subsequent raises given to those in
the old job classification.26 The Fourth Circuit refused to interpret "rate"
to mean classification rate because the interpretation would violate a
basic canon of statutory construction that courts should give effect to all
words in a statuteY Instead, the Fourth Circuit applied the rule of
canon of statutory construction). Although many courts recognize the plain meaning rule,
the variations of the rule are considerable and courts have differed in justifying a departure
from the rule. See, e.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975) (courts are to give
language of statute its ordiniary meaning in absence of persuasive reasons to contrary);
United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) (if literal reading of statutory
language is irreconcilable with congressional purpose, court must consider less literal con-
struction).
647 F.2d at 429-430. See Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(court held "regular rate of pay" in § 843(b)(3) does not include subsequent pay raises given
to miners in transferred miner's prior job classification); notes 40 & 44 infra (explaining Hig-
gins decision).
24 647 F.2d at 429. See United States v. American Trucking Assn's., 310 U.S. 534,
542-43 (1940) (words taken from context do not contribute greatly to determining purpose
of draftsmen of statute); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974) (court
must read all parts of statute together, neither taking specific words out of context nor in-
terpreting one part so as to render another meaningless). See note 50 infra (Matala court
improperly narrowed rule of construction applied in Snider).
647 F.2d at 429.
25 1d The Matala court's reasoning regarding § 843(b)(3) appears to be that if "rate"
means classification rate, which includes the subsequent pay raises, then the phrase "received
by him immediately prior to his transfer" has no meaning because the miner did not actually
receive the subsequent raises immediately prior to his transfer. See 647 F.2d at 429; 30
U.S.C. § 843(b)(3) (1976). The court's reliance on the word "immediately" is misplaced,
however, because when the Senate wrote an analogous provision in 1977 which clearly
specified protection of a miner's compensation based on the miner's classification rate, the
Senate again used the words "immediately prior to this transfer" as a reference point. See
30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(7) (Supp. III 1979); S. Rep. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 95-181]. According to the Matala court classification rate
refers to the schedule of wage increases for each job classification under the provisions of
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974. 647 F.2d at 429; see Higgins v. Mar-
shall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (classification rate refers to schedule wage in-
creases under provisions of National Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1971); note 15 supra
(explaining National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1979); notes 40 & 44 infra (Hig-
gins decision).
647 F.2d at 429. See Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934) (a court can-
not interpret single section of statute in settling as complex as that-of revenue acts apart
from related sections); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974) (a court
must read all parts of statute together, neither taking specific words out of context nor in-
terpreting one part so as to render another meaningless).
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statutory construction that a court should not reject the plain meaning
of a statute unless there is substantial unambiguous evidence supporting
a contrary interpretation.2 8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Matala's interpretation of section 843(b)(3) was at odds with the plain
meaning of the section and held that a transferred miner is entitled only
to receive the dollar amount he received immediately prior to transfer.'
Although the Matala court found that resort to the legislative
history was not necessary, the court discussed and found the available
legislative history inconclusive regarding an alternative interpretation."
The court concluded that the legislative history contained no evidence
that Congress intended "regular rate of pay" to mean classification
rate.' Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that its plain meaning inter-
pretation of section 843(b)(3) was not contrary to congressional intent in
enacting the section.2 The Matala court determined that, under its inter-
pretation of the section, a transferred miner would incur no loss in com-
pensation upon transfer because he would receive the same dollar
amount he received prior to his transfer.' In addition, the Fourth Circuit
determined that a court cannot use the legislative history to create an
ambiguity in the plain meaning of the language of the section. 4 Because
the court found no substantial unambiguous evidence that a plain mean-
2 647 F.2d at 429-30.
29 Id. at 430. See State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924-25 n.20 (4th Cir.
1977). In Train, the court held that the words of a statute remain the most persuasive in-
dication of congressional intent, and a court should reject their apparent meaning only on
substantial, unambiguous evidence supporting a contrary interpretation. Id. The Train
court, however, also stated that most courts have agreed that a court cannot disregard
available extrinsic aids. Id. When a court will refuse to apply the plain meaning rule is
uncertain. See note 22 supra (cases reaching conflicting decisions regarding when courts
will disregard plain meaning rule). Some courts have held that a court should interpret
statutes to effectuate the congressional intent in enacting the statute even if the plain
meaning of the statute would require a different result. See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444
U.S. 527, 536 (1980) (analysis does not stop with language of statute, court must look to ob-
jects and policy of law to give Act construction that will carry into execution will of
legislature); In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 1977) (unnecessary to follow
plain meaning of statutory language where to do so would not effectuate purpose of federal
legislation and would produce absurd or nugatory results).10 647 F.2d at 430; see note 15 supra (Matala's arguments based on Act's legislative
history).
1' 647 F.2d at 430 n.6. The Matala court, in support of its argument that Congress did
not intend "regular rate of pay" to mean classification rate, looked at the 1977 amendments
to the Act that applied only to non-coal mining industries. Id- The court emphasized that
Congress did not adopt a suggestion to change the wording of § 843(b)(3) to make clear that
Congress intended "regular rate of pay" to include subsequent pay increases granted to
miners in a transferred miner's prior job classification. Id- See S. REP. No. 95-181, [19771
U.S. CODi CONG. & AD. Naws 3401, 3435 (legislative history of 1977 Amendments to Act).
12 645 F.2d at 430.
SId. For two periods in which Matala received less than the dollar amount he received
prior to transferring positions in the mine,.the Fourth Circuit ruled that Matala was entitled
to back pay to make up the difference between the dollar amount he received prior to
transfer and what he was actually paid for the two periods. Id at 430 n.7.
647 F.2d at 430.
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ing construction of the section is incorrect, the court found no need to
resort to the legislative history in interpreting the statute.'5 The Matala
court thus held that the language of section 843(b)(3) is clear and unam-
biguous, and that the court's plain meaning construction of the section is
not contrary to the purpose of the Act. 6
Judge Sprouse dissented, contending that the language of section
843(b)(3) is ambiguous because use of language peculiar to the mining in-
dustry causes conflicting notions regarding the plain meaning of the sec-
tion." The dissent argued, therefore, that the majority should have
resorted to statutory interpretive aids to determine the correct meaning
of the section." Judge Sprouse further contended that the congressional
intent of section 843(b)(3) is explicit in the purpose of the Act set out in
section 801(a) which states that the first concern of all in the coal mining
industry must be the health and safety of miners. 9 In addition, the dis-
sent noted that the Senate emphasized without qualification that a
transferring miner was to suffer no loss of compensation."0 Thus, the dis-
3 Id.
SId.
Id. at 431 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Judge Sprouse relied heavily on the dissenting
opinion in Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., dissenting), for
evidence to support his conclusion that the language of § 843(b)(3) is ambiguous and that the
congressional intent of § 843(b)(3) is explicit in the purpose of the Act. See note 40 infra
(Higgins action).
' 647 F.2d at 431 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Contrary to the majority, Judge Sprouse
concentrated on the purpose of the Act and the 1969 legislative history, contending that the
intent of the 1977 Congress provided little guidance regarding the intent of the 1969 Con-
gress. 647 F.2d at 431. See 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (Supp. II 1978) (purpose of Act); note 1 infra
(cases explaining purpose of Act). See note 31 supra (majority relied on 1977 amendments to
demonstrate court's interpretation was consistent with congressional intent).
" 647 F.2d at 432 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). See 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (Supp. II 1978); note 1
supra (cases explaining purpose of Act).
0 647 F.2d at 432 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). See note 14 supra (Matala's loss of wages);
Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The majority in Matala relied
heavily on Higgins to support the holding that "regular rate of pay" in § 843(b)(3) does not
include subsequent pay raises given to miners in the transferred miner's prior job classifica-
tion. 647 F.2d at 429. Higgins involved three plaintiff-coal miners who transferred pursuant
to § 843(b)(1) of the Act. 584 F.2d at 1036. Each miner continued to receive the same wages
of $41.50 per day as the miners received in their prior job classification, even though miners
in the transferred miners' new job classification ordinarily received only $37.25 per day. Id
While miners in the transferred miners' prior job classification received scheduled increases
in the daily wage rate for the job classification, the transferred miners' daily wage rate re-
mained the same. Id. at 1036 n.1. By the time the plaintiff-miners brought suit, the transfer-
red miners were losing $8.54 per day in relation to what they would have received had they
never transferred. I. The plaintiffs presented three arguments on appeal, two of which
were similar to arguments raised by the plaintiff in Matala. Id. at 1037; see note 15 supra
(Matala's arguments for interpretation of § 843(b)(3)).
The plaintiffs argument not raised in Matala focused on the word "regular" and pro-
posed that since a miner's classification rate would be more regular than a miner's dollar
rate, the job classification rate is the regular rate embodied in § 843(b)(3). Brief for Ap-
pellants, at 13-14, Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Thus, the miners con-
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sent concluded that the majority should have interpreted the phrase
..regular rate of pay" to mean job classification rate, so that the remedial
purpose of the Act would be carried out.41
Although neither the Matala court nor the D.C. Circuit has inter-
preted the phrase "regular rate of pay" in section 843(b)(3) to mean the
job classification rate, the dissent in Matala raises serious questions
regarding the Fourth Circuit's failure to interpret the phrase in light of
the purpose of the Act, which is to protect the health and safety of
miners.2 The dissent properly argued that the majority's interpretation
of the phrase "regular rate of pay" will not protect the health and safety
of miners." Contrary to the purpose of the Act, the great majority of
miners affected with black lung are choosing to maintain their job classi-
fication rate of pay and risk their health." Currently, medical science has
found no specific remedy for black lung disease."5 Moreover, the only ef-
tended that the administrative law judge and the district court misinterpreted the plain
meaning of the term "regular rate of pay," and that the proper interpretation included the
disputed pay raises. Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d at 1037. The Higgins court rejected all
three arguments on the grounds that the language of § 843(b)(3) is simple and straightfor-
ward. 584 F.2d at 1037. Moreover, the court found that neither the legislative history nor
other evidence contradicted the plain meaning construction of the section. Id.
The majority in Higgins stated that the sole issue was whether the disputed phrase in
§ 843(b)(3) means that a mine operator cannot deny a transferring miner the future pay in-
creases he would have received had he not transferred. Id. at 1036-37. Over a strong dissent
by Chief Judge Wright, the Higgins majority held that § 843(b)(3) entitled transferred
miners to the same dollar amount increases applicable to the new job classification and not
the increases applicable to the old job classification. Id. at 1037-38; 584 F.2d 1035, 1039
(Wright, C. J., dissenting). See generally Note, Employee Compensation-Statutory Inter-
pretation of "Regular Rate of Pay" in the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of
1969-Higgins v. Marshall, No. 77-1829 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 1978) 52 TEMP. L.Q. 121 (1979).
"t 647 F.2d at 432 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
" 647 F.2d at 431-32 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 1 supra (pur-
pose of Act). Accord, Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C. J.,
dissenting). See notes 40 supra & 44 infra (explanation of Higgins).
,s 647 F.2d at 432 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). See Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035,
1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
" See Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1038 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (because mine
operators refuse to pay transferees' wage increases according to their prior job classifica-
tions, less than one-fourth of those entitled to transfer have done so); H.R. REP. No. 563,
supra note 1, at 2518-19 (transfer provisions of § 843 equal in importance to dust control
sections of Act as measure to fulfill public policy of total prevention of black lung disease);
see text accompanying note 2 supra (black lung disease and importance of preventive
measures). The dissenting opinion in Higgins noted that the appellant miners were receiv-
ing 17% less compensation in 1977 than they would have been receiving had they chosen
continued exposure to coal dust. 584 F.2d 1035, 1040 n.5 (Wright, C. J., dissenting). Further,
the Higgins dissent stated that the loss in compensation has increased steadily over time,
both absolutely and as a percentage of wages paid. Id Within eight months after Matala
transferred he was already losing $2.20 per day. 642 F.2d at 428 n.4; see note 14 supra
(Matala's losses due to transfer); Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1036 n.1 (when appel-
lant miners transferred in November, 1972, by December 1976, transferred miners were
making $8.54 per day less than they would have been had they not transferred).
I H.R. REP. No. 563, supra note 1, at 2518 (no specific therapy for black lung in either
simple or complicated form).
19821
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
fective preventive measures are adequate environmental dust controls,
use of respirators, and removal of minors from the dusty environment
as soon as they show minimal effects of black lung disease." Under the
Matala court's interpretation of "regular rate of pay," miners effectively
are faced with a choice between their health or a certain loss of pay. In
addition, courts repeatedly have interpreted the Act liberally because
the Act is remedial.4 7 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the
plain meaning of section 843(b)(3) is in conflict with the purpose of the
Act set out in section 801(a).4
The Matala court's statement that a court need not look at the
legislative history of the Act because the language of section 843(b)(3) is
clear and unambiguous does not justify the court's failure to interpret
section 843(b)(3) to comport with the purpose of the Act.49 A basic rule of
statutory construction states that a court must read all parts of a statute
together." Congress expressly stated the purpose of the Act in section
801(a) of the Act.5' Thus, the Fourth Circuit need not turn to the
legislative history to find an ambiguity in the language of section
843(b)(3).2 Instead, the court should have interpreted section 843(b)(3) in
"' Id. at 2518-19. See text accompanying note 2 supra (black lung disease and impor-
tance of preventive measures).
" See, e.g., Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n.,
606 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1979) (courts must interpret Act liberally to effect purpose of pro-
tecting safety and health of miners); Paluso v. Mathews, 562 F.2d 33, 36 (10th Cir. 1977)
(remedial nature of Act compels courts to give Act liberal construction); Morris v. Mathews,
557 F.2d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 1977) (federal courts and administrative agencies must interpret
provisions of Act to effectuate congressional purpose); Ziegler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d
398, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (remedial nature of Act mandates liberal construction rather than
literal interpretation that would impair effectiveness of statute); UMW v. Kleppe, 532 F.2d
1403, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (duty to interpret Act in light most
favorable to miners since legislation is remedial safety statute).
" See 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (Supp. II 1978); text accompanying note 1 supra (purpose of
Act).
" See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 398 (1971) (if court cannot recon-
cile literal reading of statute with congressional purpose, court must consider less literal
construction); Caruth v. United States, 566 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1978) (plain meaning of
statutory language is determinative of congressional intent unless to do so is inconsistent
with purpose of law).
I See Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934) (court cannot interpret sec-
tion of statute apart from related sections in setting as complex as that of revenue acts);
United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974) (court must read all parts of statute
together, neither taking specific words out of context not interpreting one part so as to
render another meaningless). The Matala court improperly cited Snider for the proposition
that all parts of a section must be read together. 647 F.2d at 429. Snider stated that all parts
of a statute must be read together and thus the Fourth Circuit too narrowly interpreted the
rule of statutory construction applied in Snider. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652
(4th Cir. 1974).
51 See 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (Supp. II 1978). See text accompanying note 1 supra (purpose
of Act).
" See note 50 supra (rule of statutory construction that all parts of statute must be
read together).
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conjunction with section 801(a).11 If the Fourth Circuit had interpreted
"regular rate of pay" in conjunction with section 801(a), the court would
have found an ambiguity in section 843(b)(3) because the Matala plain
meaning interpretation of section 843(b)(3) is clearly contrary to the pur-
pose of the Act. Furthermore, transferred miners have brought two
other actions regarding the meaning of the disputed language in section
843(b)(3), indicating that the language of the section is ambiguous.' Final-
ly, the Fourth Circuit's holding that the ordinary meaning of "rate" is
dollar amount is questionable." The term "rate" is a flexible term whose
meaning depends upon its use in a particular context. 8 Moreover, courts
have distinguished the terms "rate" and "amount." 7 Therefore, the
' See, e.g., State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1977) (inter-
preting § 301(b)(1) of Federal Water Pollution Control Act to comport with rest of Act);
United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652-55 (4th Cir. 1977) (interpreting § 7205 of Internal
Revenue Code (IRO) to comport with IRC as whole and to comport with use of statutory
language used throughout history of revenue acts); note 24 supra" (explaining rule of
statutory construction that courts should read all parts of statute together). Generally, the
word "act" refers to the entire statute enacted, rather than to a section. See Board of
Trustees of Fireman's Relief & Pension Fund v. Templeton, 184 Okla. 281, _; 86 P.2d
1000, 1002 (Okla. 1939); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 24 (5th ed. 1979).
See Mullins v. Andrus, No. 77-1086, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 31, 1980); Higgins v.
Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978); note 40 supra (explanation of Higgins action).
In Mullins, the transferred miner's job classification was that of a general inside laborer,
even though the mine operator often gave the miner temporary assignments as a roof
bolter. No. 77-1086, slip op. at.5. The miner, Mullins, exercised his right to transfer under §
843. Id.; slip op. at 5-6. After the transfer, the mine operator compensated Mullins at a
dollar amount accorded Mullins' job classification immediately prior to Mullins' transfer. Id.
Mullins brought an action against his employer contending that he deserved a higher rate of
compensation because he had worked and had been paid at the higher level wage accorded
to the roof bolter job classification during more than 700/o of the five months preceding his
transfer. Id., slip op. at 6. Relying on the D.C. Circuit's earlier decision in Higgins, the court
noted that a transferred miner takes with him his regular dollar rate of pay, and not the job
classification rate for his prior position. Id., slip op. at 23. Therefore, the court held that the
statute entitled a transferred miner to the rate of compensation he actually and regularly
received immediately prior to his transfer. Id., slip op. at 29. Because Mullins received pay
at two different rates at different times before transfer, neither the period which is "imme-
diately prior to transfer" nor the "regular rate of pay received" during that period were
concepts precise enough for the court to fix the amount due. Id., slip op. at 30 n.117.
Therefore, the Mullins court remanded the case to the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices for computation of the amount due Mullins. Id.
647 F.2d at 429. See Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035,1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978); text ac-
companying notes 56 and 57 infra (explaining flexible meaning of word "rate").
I See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. City of Lynn, 259 Mass. 1, -, 156 N.E. 42, 47 (1927)
(regarding revenue acts, "rate" is flexible term having different meanings dependent upon
context and result legislature intended to accomplish); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 44, 1082 (New College Ed. 1979) ("rate" defined as both cost per
unit of commodity or service and placing in particular rank or grade).
" See, e.g., E.C. Miller Cedar Lumber Co. v. United States, 86 F.2d 429, 434 (C.C.P.A.
1936) (court found Congress did not intend "rate of duty" to include "amount of duties");
Naylor v. Board of Educ., 216 Ky. 766, -, 288 S.W. 690, 692 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926) (words
"amount" and "rate" have different meanings).
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language of section 843(b)(3) is ambiguous, and the court would be justi-
fied in turning to the legislative history of the Act and other statutory
interpretative aids to determine the meaning of section 843(b)(3) and the
intent of Congress in enacting the section. 8 Consequently, there is no
justification for the Matala court's failure to interpret section 843(b)(3) to
comport with the purpose of the Act.-9
An interpretation of section 843(b)(3) in light of the express purpose
of the Act clearly comports with legislative intent and furthers achieve-
ment of the Act's goals."0 Conversely, the Matala court's plain meaning
interpretation of "regular rate of pay" chills a miner's exercise of his
rights to preserve his health by transferring positions in a mine under
section 843.1 Contrary to prior Fourth Circuit decisions, the Matala deci-
sion ignores the remedial nature of the Act by giving a restrictive inter-
pretation to provisions designed to promote the health and safety of
miners.2 In a circuit which contains half of the underground coal mining
operations in the United States, the Matala decision will retard progress
toward achieving a reduction in the incidence of black lung disease and
frustrate the Act's purpose of promoting the health and safety of coal
miners.13
WILLIAM HIGGS
See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (court should look at legislative
history in construing statute only if meaning of statute is unclear); United States v. Public
Utilities Comm'n., 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (where statute is ambiguous, judiciary may prop-
erly use legislative history to determine congressional purpose).
" See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra (explaining Matala court's failure to inter-
pret § 843(b)(3) to comport with purpose of Act).
I See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra (disincentives involved in inadequacies of
not construing "regular rate of pay" to mean job classification rate).
"See note 44 & 47 supra (chilling effect of plain meaning interpretation on exercise of
rights under § 843).
6 See Rose v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 614 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1980) (Congress intended
courts to interpret Act liberally in favor of miner and his dependents); Westmoreland Coal
Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n., 606 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1979)
(courts must interpret Act liberally to effect purpose of protecting safety and health of
miners); note 47 supra (listing cases from other circuits standing for same proposition).
' See United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration, In-
jury Experience In Coal Mining (1980) (draft copy) (50% of the 2,341 underground
bituminous coal mining operations in U.S. are located in states of Virginia and West
Virginia); notes 40-47 supra (explaining disincentives involved in Matala decision construing
"regular rate of pay" to mean dollar amount).
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B. Reverse-FOIA Litigation
In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to
alleviate the problem of government agencies arbitrarily withholding in-
formation from the public.' The FOIA requires government agencies to
release information unless the information sought falls within one of the
Act's nine exemptions listed in section 552(b).2 The exemptions include
information relating to state secrets, internal agency rules and prac-
tices, trade secrets and confidential or privileged financial or commercial
information, agency personnel files, and medical files.' An individual re-
questing access to governmental information (requester) may bring a
FOIA suit to force an agency to release gathered information after the
agency determines that the information requested falls within one of the
exemptions and makes a discretionary decision to withhold the informa-
tion.4 The term "reverse-FOIA" suit describes an action in which an in-
Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552) (1976). See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979) (Con-
gress passed FOIA in response to concern about secrecy in Governmental abuse of power);
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sees. 4-5, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2418, 2421-2422 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1497] (examples of improper
denials to disclose government information). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), reprinted in Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source Book 36 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Source Book] (FOIA enacted to make clear that disclosure
statute, not withholding statute, intended by Congress). See generally Campbell, Reverse
Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need For Congressional Action, 67 GEO. L. J.
103 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Campbell].
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291-92
(1979) (FOIA is exclusively disclosure statute whose exemptions do not rule out disclosure,
but only demarcate limits of agency's obligation to disclose information); Department of Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (FOIA's limited exemptions from disclosure do
not obscure basic policy of Act that disclosure is Act's dominant objective).
- 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-94
(1979) (nine exemptions to FOIA do not prohibit disclosure of information falling within ex-
emptions, but merely permits agencies, in their discretion, to withhold information); Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Balt., 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1974) (FOIA does
not forbid disclosure of any records, and government officials may disclose information ex-
empt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA). A number of agencies have promulgated
regulations providing for disclosure of exempt information whenever disclosure appears to
further the public interest. See, e.g., Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 16.1(a) (1980)
(Department will disclose information exempt under FOIA if disclosure is in pulic interest);
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 C.F.R. § 9.9(a) (1981) (Commission will disclose exempt
information if disclosure not contrary to public interest and will not adversely affect rights
of any person); Department of Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 2.13(d) (1980) (Department will refuse to
disclose exempt information only if disclosure prohibited by statute or Executive Order or
sound grounds exist for refusal); Office of Secretary of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 70.11(b) (1981)
(Secretary will disclose exempt information if in public interest and will not impede
discharge of functions of Labor Department). H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 1, at 2423
(FOIA strikes balance considering right to public to know, need of government to keep in-
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dividual who has submitted information to the government (submitter)
later sues to prevent an agency from releasing the information.'
Although the FOIA provides a cause of action for requesters to force
disclosure of information,' the Act does not provide expressly for
reverse-FOIA suits to prevent disclosure. 7 The majority of reverse-
FOIA suits involve business documents that submitters contend are con-
fidential and, therefore, exempt from mandatory disclosure under the
trade secrets exemption provided by section 552(b)(4) of the FOIA.' Con-
formation in confidence, and individual's right to privacy and to confide in government). See
generally GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS 173 (R. Bouchard
& J. Franklin ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as GUIDEBOOK].
I See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1198 (7th Cir. 1978),
vacated, 441 U.S. 918 (1979) (court denied Sears' request for injunction to prevent Labor
Department from disclosing Equal Employment Opportunity Reports (EEO's) and Affir-
mative Action Program Reports (AAP's) submitted to Department); Planning Research
Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 555 F.2d 970, 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court dismissed
Planning Research Corp.'s suit to prevent FPC disclosure of methodology for development
of computer system submitted to FPC with contract bid); Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093, 1094-95 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), vacated, 625 F.2d 719 (6th
Cir. 1979) (court granted Parkridge Hospital's request for temporary injunction to prevent
Blue Cross from disclosing Provider Cost Report submitted to Blue Cross as financial in-
termediary engaged in administration of Medicare Program under contract with Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare). See generally Clement, The Rights of Submitters
to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom
of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 587, 589-90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cle-
ment]; Campbell supra note 1.
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). Agencies ordinarily must determine whether to disclose
particular records within 10 days of a request for information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6(AI(i)
(1976). Upon an agency refusal to disclose requested information, the requester may sue for
disclosure in the district courts and the court's determination must be de novo rather than
on the agency record. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); see text accompanying notes 49-51 infra (de novo
review and review on administrative records). Courts must hear FOIA suits on an ex-
pedited basis. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C), (D) (1976). In addition, successful FOIA plaintiffs may
recover attorney's fees and, upon a judicial finding of arbitrary withholding, the govern-
ment employee responsible may be disciplined. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E), (F).
' See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979) (FOIA is disclosure statute ex-
clusively and affords submitters no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure).
8 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286-88, 318-19 (action to prevent
release of information about Chrysler's affirmative action programs and general composi-
tion of work forces because information was confidential remanded to consider whether con-
templated disclosures would violate Trade Secrets Act); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n., 598 F.2d 790, 794, 815 (3d Cir. 1979) (court granted GTE's request for
injunction to prevent release of information relating to safety of television sets because in-
formation is misleading for purposes of informing public and misleading information is con-
fidential and would damage GTE's competitive position); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (court
granted Westinghouse's request for temporary injunction to prevent disclosure of affir-
mative action program and equal opportunity reports on grounds that information is con-
fidential). See Clement, supra note 5, at 589 n.7 (cases involving submitters attempting to
prevent disclosure of business information); GUIDEBOOK, supra note 4, at 174 (majority of
reverse FOIA cases involve business documents).
In National Parks and Conservation Ass'. v. Morton, the court set out the test for
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sequently, whether or not a submitter has a cause of action to prevent
disclosure has been the thereshold question in reverse-FOIA suits.'
Until recently, submitters relied on three different theories as a
basis for reverse-FOIA suits.10 The first theory implied a cause of action
from the nine categories exempted from disclosure under section 552(b)
of the FOIA." The submitters argued that the exemptions require the
agency to withhold information falling within the exemptions.'2 The se-
cond theory inferred d private cause of action to prevent disclosure of in-
formation that is exempt under the FOIA through section 1905 of the
Trade Secrets Act (TSA).'3 Section 1905 is a criminal statute that im-
poses fines against federal officials who disclose certain categories of
business information "unless authorized by law."" Because section 1905
determining what is "confidential" information within the meaning of the trade secrets ex-
emption of the FOIA. 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The D.C. Circuit held that informa-
tion is confidential within the scope of the trade secrets exemption if the information is likely
to impair the government's ability to obtain information in the future or cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of the person who submitted the information. 498 F.2d at
770.
, See text accompanying notes 10-17 infra (different theories supporting cause of ac-
tion for submitters to prevent disclosure).
1" See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 288 (submitter advanced three
theories in support of injunction against agency disclosure of submitted information); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1198 & n.4, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
918 (1979) (same); Note, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown: Seeking a Formula For Responsible
Disclosure Under the FOIA, 29 CATH. L. REV. 159, 167 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Responsi-
ble Disclosure] (listing three theories relied on by submitters).
" See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1211 (4th Cir.
1976), cerL denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (court reasoned that § 552(b) granting private party
protection from disclosure implies right of court to invoke equity jurisdiction to assure that
protection, and FOIA exemptions constitute mandatory bar to disclosure); Pennzoil Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1976) (court rejected producer's argu-
ment that FOIA's exemptions are mandatory bar to disclosure of information falling within
one of exemptions); 5 U.S.C.'§ 552(b) (1976).
" See note 11 supra (decisions explaining claims that FOIA exemptions are mandatory
bars to disclosure).
" See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1202 n.15 (7th Cir. 1978),
vacated on other grounds, 441 U.S. 918 (1979) (court rejected submitter's contention that §
1905 should be interpreted to imply private cause of action because section's criminal
penalties are inadequate); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1188 (3d Cir. 1977),
vacated on other grounds, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (rejecting submitter's contention that courts
should interpret § 1905 to provide submitters with private cause of action); 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Supreme Court explained
the meaning of the phrase "unless authorized by law" of § 1905. 441 U.S. 281, 295-316 (1979).
The Court held that for an agency regulation to have the force and effect of law, the regula-
tion must be a substantive regulation as opposed to a procedural regulation. Id. at 301. A
substantive regulation affects individual rights and obligations while a procedural regula-
tion is only a general statement of policy or procedural rules. Id. at 302. Furthermore, an
agency must enact substantive regulations pursuant to the procedural limitations found in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 303. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976). Finally,
a nexus must exist between the substantive agency regulation providing for disclosure of in-
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applies only to business information, it was used as a basis for reverse-
FOIA actions only by business information submitters. 5 The third
theory relied upon section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) as the basis for reverse-FOIA actions. 8 Section 702 provides that
a person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action, is entitled to judicial review of
the action.17 The submitters contended that diclosure by the agency is an
agency action under section 702, and that the adverse consequences of
the agency's action provide the submitter with a cause of action to pre-
vent disclosure. 8
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 9 the Supreme Court held that a court
cannot imply a private cause of action for submitters from the exemp-
tions in section 552(b) of the FOIA. ° The Supreme Court further held
that, although section 1905 applies to the disclosure of an individual's
business documents, the section does not supply a private cause of action
for submitters s.2 The Court, however, did use the trade secrets exemp-
tion in section 552(b)(4) of the FOIA, section 1905 of the TSA, and section
702 of the APA to find judicial review of an agency's decision to disclose
an individual's business information available under the APA.' The
formation within the FOIA's nine exemptions and some delegation by Congress of
legislative authority to disclose the exempted information to the public. 441 U.S. at 304. The
Chrysler Court explained that the nexus requirement means only that a reviewing court
reasonably be able to conclude that the congressional grant of authority contemplates the
regulations issued. Id. at 306. The Court also held that the FOIA cannot serve as the con-
gressional authorization for disclosure regulations that permit the release of information
within the Act's nine exemptions. Id. at 303-04.
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
16 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See note 18 infra (decisions using § 702 as basis for reverse-
FOIA actions).
1 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
IS See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317-18 (1979); Charles River Park "A,"
Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.6, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (§ 702 provides normal method of
reviewing agency action and is sufficient to protect any interests § 1905 is supposed to pro-
tect). See note 22 infra (application of § 702 of APA in Chrysler). The plaintiff-submitter ob-
tains standing to sue under § 702 by alleging an injury in fact and that the alleged injury has
affected an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute governing the agency action. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972). In
the case of a submitter of confidential business information, the requirements of Sierra Club
v. Morton are met by the alleged harm to the submitter's competitive position, which Con-
gress included within the FOIA's zone of interests. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at
317-18. See National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768-69 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
1441 U.S. 281 (1979).
Id. at 292.
21 Id. at 295-301, 317-18.
Id at 317-18. In Chrysler, the Supreme Court held that § 1905 and any "authoriza-
tion by law" contemplated by § 1905 place substantive limits on agency action, and,
therefore, an agency's decision to disclose exempt information is reviewable agency action
and the submitter of the information is a person adversely affected or aggrieved within the
meaning of § 702 of the APA. Id. See note 18 supra (explanation of submitter attempts to
obtain standing to sue under APA).
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Chrysler Court did not decide the proper scope of the review, nor the
relative scopes of the trade secrets exemption and section 1905.1 In-
stead, the Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit for a determina-
tion of whether the contemplated disclosure would violate the prohibi-
tion against disclosure of section 1905 of the TSA.24
Recently, in General Motors Corp. v. Marshall,' the Fourth Circuit
considered the proper scope of review in reverse-FOIA cases under the
APA and the relative scope of the trade secrets exemption and section
1905 that the Supreme Court did not decide in Chrysler." To receive ap-
proval of their government contract bids, two Federal contractors sub-
mitted business information to the Department of Defense pursuant to
two executive orders.Y The Department of Defense subsequently noti-
fied the contractor-plaintiffs that the Department had received a request
for certain parts of the information and intended to release the informa-
tion requested.' The plaintiffs objected to the disclosures, contending
that the information was confidential and that their competitive posi-
tions would be harmed severely by the disclosure of the information
they had submitted.' In making their objections, the plaintiffs relied on
2 441 U.S. at 318-19. The Chrysler Court noted that the pertinent provisions of the
APA regarding the scope of review in reverse-FOIA cases are § ,06(2)(A) and (F). Id at 318.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (F) (1976). See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 infra (explanation
of § 706(2(A)); text accompanying note 51 infra (explanation of § 706(2)(F)). Because the
Supreme Court found that the determination of the scope of § 1905 necessarily would have
some effect on the proper form of judicial review pursuant to § 706(2), the Court opined that
to decide the issue regarding the scope of § 1905 would be both unnecessary and unwise. 441
U.S. at 319.
2 Id. at 318-19. In the Chrysler action, on remand, the Third Circuit found that the
determination of the applicability of § 1905 to the requested information should be made in
the first instance by the agency form which the information was requested. Chrysler Corp.
v. Schlesinger, 611 F.2d 439, 440 (3d Cir. 1979). The court therefore remanded the case to
the district court with directions to order the agency to make a new determination in light
of the Third Circuit's prior opinion and the opinion of the Supreme Court. Id.
2n 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981).
2Id. "at 297-98.
" Id at 295 & n.1. General Motors consists of a consolidation on appeal of two similar
actions, one of which has not been reported. Id. See Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp.
375 (E.D. Va. 1980); text accompanying notes 28-30 infra (explanation of Burroughs).
654 F.2d at 295. The request to one contractor by the Department of Defense was
for information relating to plaintiffs affirmative action program, equal opportunity employ-
ment, complaint investigation and compliance review reports, and related work force data
concerning plaintiffs plants. Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp. 375, 377 (E.D. Va.
1980). The record is not clear concerning what information the Department sought from the
second contractor.
1 501 F. Supp. 375, 379 (E.D. Va. 1980). The district court in Burroughs concluded that
plaintiff would be harmed either because a competitor could use the information to reduce
its costs; or a competitor would utilize the information in bidding against plaintiff. Id. at 380.
Moreover, disclosure of information could result in the transfer of technology to domestic
and foreign competitors and to foreign governments; or competitors could use information
to conduct raiding of plaintiff's employees. Id. at 381. In addition, release of the information
could damage plaintiff's employee moral. Id
1982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
section 1905 of the TSA and the trade secrets exemption in section
552(b)(4) of the FOIA contending that the acts provide protection for sub-
mitters against disclosures of the confidential business information they
supplied to the government.3° The Department denied plaintiffs' objec-
tions on the grounds that section 1905 does not apply to disclosures
authorized by law.3' The Department also stated that unless enjoined the
Department intended to release the disputed information after ten
days.32 The plaintiffs each filed actions in district court asserting an im-
plied private right of action to prevent disclosure of the information
under section 1905 and the FOIA, as well as a right to judicial review
under the APA.1 Plaintiffs in each case agreed to a stay of proceedings
awaiting the decision in Chrysler, then pending in the Supreme Court. 4
After the Supreme Court decided Chrysler, the Department of
Defense filed a motion requesting the court to remand both cases to the
Department for review of the plaintiffs' objections to disclosure in light
of the Chrysler decision. The plaintiffs in turn filed for summary judg-
ment. The district court denied defendant's motions to remand, and,
after a hearing based on the undisputed facts, granted the plaintiffs' mo-
tions for summary judgment. 7 The Department of Defense appealed to
the Fourth Circuit.
3 8
After consolidating the actions, the Fourth Circuit determined that
the General Motors action turned on the scope of the Supreme Court's
decision in Chrysler.9 The Fourth Circuit noted that neither the FOIA
nor any regulations issued pursuant to the FOIA could serve to fill the
10 Id at 383. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra (theories which base a private
cause of action for submitters to prevent government disclosure of confidential business in-
formation on TSA, § 1905 and trade secrets exemption of FOIA).
11 654 F.2d at 295. The Department of Labor found the authorization by law required
by § 1905 in regulations issued by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) of the
Department of Labor and in regulations issued under § 301 of the APA. IdM See 5 U.S.C. §
301 (1976). The OFCCP regulations generally concern the categories of information accessi-
ble to the public, the types of records subject to prohibitions or restrictions on disclosure
and the procedures governing where and how the public may obtain access to the informa-
tion. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-40.1 to -40.8 (1980). Section 301 is a general agency housekeeping
statute allowing an agency head to prescribe regulations for the government of his depart-
ment, including the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. 5
U.S.C. § 301 (1976). In Chrysler, the Supreme Court specifically rejected § 301 and the OFCCP
regulations as fulfilling the "unless authorized by law" requirement of § 1905. 441 U.S. at
306, 309-10. See note 14 supra (requirements of "unless authorized by law" language of §
1905).




" Id See Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp. 375, 384 (E.D. Va. 1980).
654 F.2d at 296.
39 1&
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"unless authorized by law" exception of section 1905 when the material
in dispute falls within any exemption to the FOIA." Because the Depart-
ment determined that the trade secrets exemption applied to the infor-
mation the Department sought to disclose,4' the court considered
whether section 1905 also was applicable to the information.4 Since
Chrysler did not determine the scope of section 1905, the Fourth Circuit
turned to one of its earlier reverse-FOIA decisions for guidance." The
court found that the Fourth Circuit previously held that the scope of sec-
tion 1905 and the trade secrets exemption are coextensive." The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that given its prior judicial precedent and the Chrysler
holding that the FOIA cannot serve to fill the "unless authorized by law"
requirement of section 1905, any information falling within the trade
secrets exemption is within the prohibition against disclosure of section
1905."5 Thus, the General Motors court held that if the trade secrets ex-
11 Id. at 296-97. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303-04 (1979); note 14
supra (regulations that can serve to fill "unless authorized by law" requirement of § 1905).
Because disclosure of government information is mandatory under the FOIA unless the in-
formation falls within one of the FOIA's nine exemptions in § 552(b), an agency can issue
regulations pursuant to the FOIA to govern only discretionary disclosures of exempt infor-
mation by the agency. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-93 (1979) (exemptions
enacted to allow agencies discretion to withhold exempted infornfation); note 2 supra (FOIA
does not apply to information falling within exemptions of § 552(b)).
" 654 F.2d at 295. The Department denied the submitters objections to disclosure find-
ing that the disclosures were authorized by law within the meaning of the exception to §
1905's prohibition against disclosure. Id. Authorization by law is necessary only when the in-
formation falls within the trade secrets exemption and when § 1905 applies. See Depart-
ment of Justice Memorandum.: Current and Future Litigation Under Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, reprinted in [1979] 435 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) D-1, D-2 (June
28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Memo] (when trade secrets exemption or § 1905
or both are raised by submitters, agency should first determine whether information falls
within trade secrets exemption); note 68 infra (means available to submitter to prevent
disclosure once court finds disclosure to be authorized by law).
42 654 F.2d at 297. See Justice Dep't Memo supra note 42, at D-2 (after agency deter-
mines that trade secrets exemption applies, agency should determine applicability of § 1905
to disputed information).
"s 654 F.2d at 297 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977)).
" 654 F.2d at 297. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1204
n.38 (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). In Westinghouse, the Fourth Circuit
relied on three decisions originating from the D.C. Circuit to conclude that the scopes of the
trade secrets exemption and § 1905 are coextensive. Id. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v.
HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (trade secrets exemption is broader than §
1905 and encompasses § 1905); Pharmaceutical Mfr's. Ass'n. v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp.
444, 446 (D.D.C. 1975) (parties agreed scope of § 1905 and trade secrets exemption coexten-
sive for purposes of case); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub
nom., Ditlow v. Bunegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974)
(type of information protected from disclosure by § 1905 is same as information protected
from disclosure by trade secrets exemption).
45 654 F.2d at 297. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303-04 (FOIA cannot
serve to fill "unless authorized by law" requirement of § 1905 in regard to information fall-
ing within FOIA's nine exemptions).
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emption applies to the information the agency seeks to disclose, section
1905 similarly applies insofar as the FOIA cannot, fulfill the "unless
authorized by law" requirement of the exception to section 1905's pro-
hibition against disclosure..
After the Fourth Circuit determined that the trade secrets exemp-
tion and section 1905 both are applicable to the information in dispute,
the court recognized that Chrysler provides a submitter with a right to
judicial review under section 706(2)(A) and (F) of the APA.4 7 Consequently,
the General Motors court considered the question of the proper scope of
review under section 706.48 Section 706(2)(A) provides that a court
reviewing agency action may hold unlawful and set aside agency action
that the court finds to be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discre-
tion or otherwise not in accordance with law.49 Moreover, the section re-
quires a reviewing court to conduct judicial review on the administrative
record only."0 Section 706(2)(F) provides that a reviewing court may hold
unlawful and set aside agency action that the court finds to be unwar-
ranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court."1 The Fourth Circuit noted the Supreme
Court's holding in Chrysler that any disclosure which violates section
1905 is not in accordance with law as required under section 706(2)(A). 2
The Fourth Circuit thus found implicit in Chrysler's holding that judicial
4 654 F.2d at 297. The General Motors court's conclusion that any information within
the trade secrets exemption is within the prohbition against disclosure of § 1905 follows
because, if § 1905 and the trade secrets exemption are coextensive, information within the
trade secrets exemption can only avoid § 1905's prohibition if disclosure of the information
is "authorized by law" within the meaning of the exception to § 1905's prohibition. Further,
the FOIA cannot serve to fulfill the "unless authorized by law" requirement of § 1905 in
regard to information which falls within one of the FOIA's exemptions. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. at 303-04. Nevertheless, another statute or regulation not issued pursuant
to the FOIA could satisfy § 1905's exception requirement. See note 14 supra (interpretation
of "unless authorized by law" language of § 1905).
47 654 F.2d 298-300. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318-19 (1979) (pertinent
provisions of APA regarding proper scope of review in reverse-FOIA cases are § 706(2)(A)
and (F)); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (F) (1976).
:8 654 F.2d at 297.
" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971) (section 706(2)(A) contemplates review on administrative record only and
reviewing court is- not allowed to substitute its judgment for that of agency). Courts also
have interpreted § 706(2)(A) to require that an agency decision reviewed under § 706(2)(A)
can be upheld only on the reasons stated by the agency. See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n., 534 F.2d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 1976); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
5' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1976). Section 706(2)(F) contemplates de novo review only where
the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate or
where there are issues that were not before the agency in a proceeding to enforce nonad-
judicatory agency action. Id. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415 (1971).
654 F.2d at 298. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979); 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1976).
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review is available the requirement that an agency, in dismissing an ob-
jection to disclosure, must set forth a reasoned and detailed basis for the
decision so that the reviewing court adequately can review the agency
action under section 706(2)(A).5 1 The court stated that where the ad-
ministrative record is sufficient and the facts are undisputed the review
could be conducted and a decision reached under section 706(2)(A) as a
question of law, and thus de novo review under section 706(2)(F) would
not be warranted.' Because the administrative records were not suffi-
cient and the administrative remedies were not exhausted the General
Motors court remanded the actions to the district court with directions
to remand to the Department so that the agency can make administra-
tive determinations in light of the Chrysler opinion."
Courts which have considered the question of the relative scopes of
section 1905 and the trade secrets exemption are in accord with the
Fourth Circuit that the scopes of section 1905 and the trade secrets ex-
emption are coextensive. 6 The Fourth Circuit's decision is open to ques-
654 F.2d at 298. Because a court must conduct judicial review only on the ad-
ministrative record and cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency's under §
706(2)(A), a reasoned and detailed basis for the agency's decision is a practical necessity if
the reviewing court is to adhere to the sthndards of § 706(2)(A) for judicial review. See
Federal Power Comm'n. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331 (1976) (if
agency decision is not sustainable on administrative record, court must vacate decision and
remand matter to agency for further consideration); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)
(same); Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, 647 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
" 654 F.2d at 298-99. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Chrysler Court found that de
novo review ordinarily is not necessary to decide whether a contemplated disclosure
violates § 1905. 654 F.2d at 298. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 411 U.S. at 318.
1 654 F.2d at 299-300. Consequently, the General Motors court drew a distinction be-
tween the scope of review under subsections (2)(A) and (2)(F) of § 706 of the APA. 654 F.2d
at 298-99. The Fourth Circuit stated that judicial review under (2)(A) is under a standard of
"abuse of discretion or not otherwise in accordance with law" and normally is subjected to
review on the administrative record only. Id. at 298. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); text ac-
companying notes 49 and 52 supra (meaning of § 706(21(A)). Alternatively, the court stated
that (2)(F) allows trial de novo in certain circumstances. 654 F.2d at 298. See § 706(2)(F)
(1976); text accompanying note 50 supra (explanation of § 706(2)(F)). Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's Chrysler opinion to recognize that circumstances
suggested in § 706(2)(F) may arise where the district court might decide that trial de novo is
necessary and that the Court did not wish to preclude the district court from using the right
to conduct de novo review. 654 F,2d 298. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318-19
(1979). The General Motors court reasoned that because de novo review ordinarily is not
necessary to determine the applicability of § 1905 to a contemplated disclosure, any decision
regarding the propriety of de novo review should await the issuance of the agency's deci-
sion. 654 F.2d at 298. After the agency's decision, the court should make a decision only on a
careful review of the administrative decision and record. Id.
' See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(trade secrets exemption broader than § 1905 and encompasses § 1905); Pharmaceutical
Mfr's. Ass'n. v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C. 1975) (litigants agreed that scopes
of § 1905 and trade secrets exemption are coextensive for purposes of case); Ditlow v. Volpe,
362 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (D.D.C. 1973) (type of information protected from disclosure by §
1905 is protected from disclosure by trade secrets exemption).
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tion, however, because the legislative history of section 1905 arguably
differs from the court's interpretation that the trade secrets exemption
is coextensive with section 1905.11 According to the legislative history,
because section 1905 originally was enacted in the 1948 recodification of
Title 18 to consolidate three prior nondisclosure statutes, section 1905
should be interpreted to coincide with the narrow scope of the prior
statutes.s In addition, two Supreme Court opinions have held that Con-
gress did not intend to make substantive changes in predecessor sta-
tutes through the 1948 recodification of Title 18 and, therefore, seeming
substantive changes should not be given effect. 9 Thus, although the
legislative history arguably conflicts with the broad language actually
enacted by Congress in section 1905,0 the Fourth Circuit's holding that
-1 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1905, 62 Stat. 683 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976)); H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A127-A128 (1947), text accompanying note
58 infra (legislative history of § 1905).
11 See H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A127-A128 (1947) (§ 1905 consolidates
three prior nondisclosure statutes appearing in 1940 edition of United States Code). The
House Report explained that "consolidation" means the consolidation of similar sections
without making fundamental changes in the offenses involved. Id. The three prior statutes
which subsequently caused Congress to enact § 1905 involved the Internal Revenue Service,
the Tariff Commission and the Commerce Department. See 15 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1940)
(originally enacted as Act of Jan. 27, 1938, ch. 11, 52 Stat. 8); 18 U.S.C. § 216 (1940) (originally
enacted as Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223); 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1940) (originally
enacted as Revenue Act of 1916, Ch. 463, § 708, 39 Stat. 756). Section 216 prohibited
disclosure of the operations, style of work, or apparatus of any taxpayer visited by the
disclosing federal officer or employee, and financial information contained in an income tax
return except as provided by law. 18 U.S.C. § 216 (1940). Section 1335 prohibited any federal
officer or employee from disclosing in any manner not provided for by law any trade secrets
or processes embraced in any examination or investigation undertaken by the Tariff Com-
mission. 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1940). Section 176(a) prohibited any employee of the Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce from disclosing statistical information furnished in con-
fidence to the Bureau. 15 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1940). See Clement supra note 5, at 602-26 (discus-
sion of legislative history of § 1905); Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information
From Federal Agency Diclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109,
118-19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Protecting Confidential Business Information] (legislative
history of § 1905).
" See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454,474 (1975) (House and Senate Reports repeatedly
caution against reading substantive changes into 1948 revision and recodification of Title 18,
Criminal Code); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 260 (1966) (1948 revision of Title 18, in-
cluding changes made in phraseology, disclosed no intention of making any change in
substantial content or coverage of law).
I Section 1905 applies in part to any information which concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the indentity, con-
fidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses or expenditures of
any person, firm, corporation or association and to any officer or employee of the United
States. The section thus is not restricted to the three agencies involved under the three
prior statutes or to the limited categories of information listed in the prior statutes. See
note 58 supra (scope of three prior statutes); Drachsler, The Freedom of Information Act
and the "Right" of Non-Disclosure, 28 AD. L. REV. 1, 10 (1976) (discussion of broad language
of § 1905); Note, Administrative Investigation-Preventing Agency Disclosure of Confiden-
tial Business Information, 28 UNIv. KAN. L. REV. 467, 477 (1980) (courts' broad interpreta-
tion of term "trade secrets" in § 1905).
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the scopes of section 1905 and the trade secrets exemption are coexten-
sive may be improper in light of the conflicting evidence regarding the
proper scope of section 1905.61
The Fourth Circuit's decision that the scopes of section 1905 and the
trade secrets exemption are coextensive requires that an agency demon-
strate that disclosure of the disputed information is authorized by law to
avoid section 1905's prohibition against disclosure.2 An agency can meet
the section's "unless authorized by law" exception either by statute or
by substantive agency regulations issued pursuant -to the procedural
limitations of the APA and having a sufficient nexus with some delega-
tion by Congress of legislative authority to disclose the exempt informa-
tion to the public.63 Although the "unless authorized by law" require-
ment may appear difficult for an agency to meet, two circuit courts since
Chrysler have considered whether an agency qualifies under the section
1905 exception and have found the requirement satisfied.64 The Fourth
1, 654 F.2d at 297. In a memorandum to other government agencies, the Department of
Justice has expressed the Department's intention to argue in the future for a narrow inter-
pretation of § 1905 on the basis of the legislative history of the section and two prior
Supreme Court decisions which held that the 1948 recodification of Title 18 should not be in-
terpreted to make any substantive changes in the predecessor statutes. Justice Dep't
Memo, supra note 41, at D-2, D-5; see notes 56-58 supra (cases interpreting scopes of § 1905
and trade secrets exemption to be coextensive and explanation of legislative history of §
1905). The Supreme Court in Chrysler implied, however, that the Court would agree with
court decisions that the scopes of § 1905 and the trade secrets exemption are coextensive.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 319 n.49 (1979). The Chrysler Court stated that
although the theoretical possibility exists that information might be outside the trade
secrets exemption yet within § 1905, the possibility is of limited significance because of the
similarity of language between the trade secrets exemption and § 1905. Id Nevertheless, no
court has considered the legislative history of § 1905 in determining the scope of the
section's application. See Clement supra note 5, at 606courts have uniformly failed to con-
sider legislative history of § 1905 in applying § 1905 to reverse-FOIA disclosure cases). G.
English, Protecting the Stakeholder. Defense of the Government Agency's Interests Dur-
ing Reverse FOIA Lawsuits, 31 AD. L. REv. 151, 165 (1979) (same).
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). In response to an FOIA request or otherwise section 1905 is
an independent prohibition against release of information within its scope if such release is
not authorized by law. Id. The FOIA cannot fulfill the "unless authorized by law" exception
to § 1905's prohibition against disclosure. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303-04
(1979). Therefore, if a court finds that § 1905 applies to information exempt under the FOIA,
any disclosure of the information would be an abuse of discretion by the agency under §
706(2)(A) of the APA. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
, See note 14 supra (requirements of "unless authorized by law" exception to § 1905's
prohibition against disclosure); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979) (same).
" See Humana of Virginia, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 622 F.2d 76, 78-79 (4th Cir. 1980); St.
Mary's Hosp. Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1979). Both the Humana and St.
Mary's Hospital courts upheld a regulation requiring disclosures of cost reports on the
grounds that the regulation had a sufficient nexus with the congressional grant of authority
in 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1976). 622 F.2d at 78-79; 604 F.2d at 410. Section 1306(a) prohibits
disclosure of any information by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare except
as the Secretary of the Department might prescribe by regulations. 622 F.2d at 78-79; 604
F.2d at 410; 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1976).
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and Fifth Circuits have construed the nexus requirement to mean only
that the reviewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of
authority contemplates the regulations issued. 5 Because courts have in-
terpreted the nexus requirement to mean only that a statute must con-
template the regulations issued, courts can more easily find the require-
ment fulfilled than if the statute had to directly address an agency's
authority to disclose confidential business information.6 If courts con-
tinue to accept the lenient interpretation of the "unless authorized by
law" exception to section 1905, disclosure regulations generally will be
upheld since disclosure of confidential business information is arguably
consistent with a variety of regulatory purposes. 7 The overall effect of
the lenient interpretation of the section 1905 exception requirements
may be to limit the ability of submitters to prevent agency disclosure of
confidential business information."
The Fourth Circuit's decision to remand the General Motors action
to the district court with directions to remand to the agency for addi-
tional administrative determinations in light of Chrysler is consistent
with past judicial deference to an agency's experience and expertise. 9
See Humana of Virginia v. Blue Cross of Virginia, 622 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1980); St.
Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1979).
" See Brookwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (N.D. Ga.
1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1295 (1980). The Brookwood court held that something less than an ex-
press grant of authority to exempt informtion from the prohibition of disclosure of § 1905 is
sufficient to meet Chrysler's nexus requirement. Id. See Protecting Confidential Business
Information, supra note 58, at 121 (less rigorous interpretation of nexus requirement will
result in more disclosure regulations being upheld than would be upheld under stricter in-
terpretation).
' See Protecting Confidential Business Information supra note 58, at 121 (examples of
when disclosure of confidential business information arguably may be consistent with
regulatory purposes). Disclosure of confidential business information arguably is consistent
with a congressional grant of authority to collect the information. See Clement supra note
5, at 623 (regulation providing for disclosure of exempt business information probably bears
reasonable relationship to enabling legislation authorizing collection of information); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 555 F.2d 82, 85-88 (3d Cir. 1977). The
court implied from general enabling legislation and agency authority to collect confidential
business information the authority to promulgate regulations requiring disclosure of con-
fidential business information when the disclosure is in the public interest. Id.
See Humana of Virginia, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 622 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1980); St. Mary's
Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1979). Once a court determines that an agency
decision to disclose is authorized by law, a submitter can prevent disclosure of the informa-
tion only if the agency did not promulgate the regulation in question based on a considera-
tion of the relevant factors. See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 534 F.2d 627, 631
(5th Cir. 1976); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). If the agency did not consider relevant factors, the
regulation is arbitrary and capricious under § 706(2)(A) of the APA. 622 F.2d at 79; 604 F.2d
at 410. See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 534 F.2d 627, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1976) (rele-
vant factors agency must consider to decide whetherfto disclose confidential business infor-
mation); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); text accompanying note 49 supra (defining § 706(2)(A)).
" 654 F.2d at 300. See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra (discussing doctrine of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies and purpose to provide for complete administrative
resolution of controversy prior to judicial review).
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The concept of judicial deference to an agency's expertise is embodied in
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.0 The purpose of
the doctrine is to allow an agency to perform functions within its special
competence, such as making a factual record, applying its expertise and
correcting its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.7" Thus, the
doctrine provides for complete administrative resolution of a controversy
prior to judicial review.72 The Fourth Circuit properly concluded,
therefore, that when the Supreme Court through its judicial decisions
alters the rules controlling an agency's determination of issues properly
before the agency after the initial decision but before judicial review, an
appellant cannot fully claim he has exhausted his administrative
remedies.7 Finally, similar to the GeneralMotors court's decision, in three
post-Chrysler decisions concerning reverse-FOIA actions in which courts
have found the administrative record to be inadequate, the courts have
remanded the action to the agency for futher administrative determina-
tions in light of Chrysler.74
The Fourth Circuit's holding that section 1905 of the TSA is coexten-
sive with the trade secrets exemption of the FOIA will result in the
trade secrets exemption being a complete bar to disclosure unless the
"unless authorized by law" exception of section 1905 is met by the agen-
cy 7 The Fourth Circuit has given, however, the section 1905 exception
o See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (long settled
rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief until he has exhausted
prescribed remedies); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d 1060, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1978)
(same). The purpose of the doctrine regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
to provide for complete administrative resolution of a controversy prior to judicial review.
See id. at 1064.
," See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (basic purpose of exhaustion doctrine to
let agency perform basic functions of making factual record, applying its expertise and cor-
recting its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579
F.2d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 1978) (doctrine affords parties and courts benefit of agency's ex-
perience, expertise and complete factual record adequate for judicial review).
7 See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 1978) (doctrine provides
complete administrative resolution prior to judicial review).
"' 654 F.2d at 299. Whether to require a party to exhaust its administrative remedies
is discretionary. See United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary, 483
F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus, if pursuing an administrative remedy would be futile, a
court may waive the requirement. Id. Pursuing the administrative remedy in General
Motors would not be futile because of the changes made by the Chrysler opinion in the rele-
vant considerations to be taken into account by the agency in making an administrative
decision in reverse-FOIA cases. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 319 (1979).
"' See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 611 F.2d 439, 439-40 (3d Cir. 1979) (on remand
from Supreme Court); General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 607 F.2d 234, 235-36 (8th Cir.
1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 600 F.2d 1237, 1237 (7th Cir. 1979). But see General
Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marshall,
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 1979), appeal pending, No. 80-1127 (D.C. Cir.) for opposite viewpoint).
" See text accompanying note 62 supra (operation of § 1905 in regard to request for in-
formation under FOIA falling within trade secrets exemption). The FOIA does not apply to
information falling within one of its exemptions. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303
(1979). Therefore, if'§ 1905 and the trade secrets exemption are coextensive, § 1905 is the
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